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Prior to its passage, various constituencies of the public called upon the 
Malawi Government to abandon its obsessive desire to enact the Civil 
Procedure (Suits by or Against the Government or Public Officers) 
(Amendment) Bill 2010 (hereafter the ‘Bill’); the call of course fell on deaf 
ears. Subsequently, and in the wake of the Bill’s approval by legislators 
(in spite of eloquent cautionary statements from independent minded 
legislators including my professional senior Mr DH Phoya), select parties 
have announced their intention to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Bill. The introduction of this Bill and its approval have ignited the passions 
of many a Malawian both within and beyond the borders of Malawi. In fact 
some of the exchanges traded by Malawians on account of the Bill have 
been nothing short of incendiary.  
So far, and listening to those that oppose the Bill, it is clear that their 
rejection of the Bill focuses on the threat the Bill poses against 
fundamental rights of individuals to seek a just and effective remedy from 
the Courts whenever the rights of the individual are potentially threatened 
or actually trampled upon. I wholly agree with this approach and from 
where I stand IT IS A VERY COMPELLING ARGUMENT. Potential scenarios 
illustrating how the infringement of rights could possibly come about have 
eloquently been described by many including a very persuasive example I 
read given by Raphael Tenthani in his weekly piece which appears on the 
online Maravi Post. I would, however, want to draw attention to an 
alternative way of looking at the potential impact of the Bill. I will nail my 
colours to the mast. I do not approve of this Bill because it represents a 
‘very clear and present danger’ to the rule of law. The Bill violates very 
clearly stated statements of constitutional principle outlined in the 
Constitution of Malawi. Here is the explanation why I feel the way I do. 
A compelling argument may equally be made against the Bill on the basis 
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. In other words, the 
argument would be whether the Parliament of Malawi has the 
constitutional authority to exercise plenary power over the jurisdiction, 
competence, and more especially, the judicial power of the Courts. 
Plenary power in simple terms may be defined as a power or authority to 
act that is vested in or granted to a body or an individual in absolute 
terms in relation to a given subject matter. The question that ought to be 
confronted here is whether Parliament has exclusive, absolute or limited 
power to determine and decide for, and on behalf of the Judiciary, what 
constitutes the legitimate area for the Judiciary to exercise its judicial 
power. I say categorically that the answer is NO!    
Comparative constitutional case law from the United States of America, 
Canada and Ireland throws light on this question. Generally, the accepted 
view is that attempts by the legislature to impose limitations on the 
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capacity of the judiciary must be based on very clear textual constitutional 
authority. The text of Article III of the United States Constitution appears 
to give Congress the authority to insulate specific areas from the scrutiny 
of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its judicial power. However, this is 
not a matter that has been exhaustively settled in the United States, and 
from my understanding of events there, politicians have refrained from 
insisting that it is within their power through Congress to interfere with 
the scope of judicial power. The position in Malawi though is very different 
in that the words of the relevant and equivalent provisions do not grant 
the legislature such plenary power. Sections 103, 104 and 108 of Chapter 
IX of the Malawi Constitution provide the indisputable basis for the 
observation I have made. In particular section 103 (2) provides as 
follows; 
The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of judicial nature 
and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue is 
within its competence. 
This section presciently anticipates the proposal that is contained in the 
Bill and rejects it outrightly. The section categorically and in very clear 
emphatic terms stipulates that only the judiciary, and the judiciary only, 
has the power to decide whether an issue is within its competence. The 
Bill, contrary to the letter and spirit of Chapter IX, seeks to fetter the 
discretion that the judiciary is given by the Constitution to decide whether 
an issue brought before the courts is of a judicial nature or not. In 
attempting to impose such a fetter the Bill is violating a cardinal principle 
of the Constitution; the separation of powers between the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary. This is an attempt to undermine the rule of 
law. 
Finally, I observed that in responding to questions put to him by Capital 
FM the Minister responsible for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Dr 
Chaponda, advanced a rationale for seeking the enactment of the Bill. He 
argued that the Bill had been prepared in the light of practical expediency. 
He explained that the Malawi Government does not have enough lawyers 
to handle legal suits on its behalf. In other words, the Government 
lawyers are overwhelmed by legal suits. No doubt this view deserves 
sympathy. However, this rationale does not constitute a compelling 
constitutional reason capable of trumping established constitutional 
principles and rights. The rationale advanced by Dr Chaponda is a policy 
reason and he is asking Malawians to acquiesce in his misguided project of 
subordinating entrenched constitutional principles to mere policy 
considerations. My argument can be put differently here; has the Minister 
drawn the attention of Malawians to a constitutional principle which clearly 
underpins and supports his position other than mere expediency? My view 
is that he has not done so and neither does he appear to have directed his 
mind to the requirement of establishing a constitutional reason for his 
action. To borrow the words of Justice Bastarache of the Supreme Court of 
Canada the Minister wishes to privilege policy considerations and that can 
only lead to the undermining of the rule of law.  
Furthermore, there is the question of the proportionality test which the 
Minister ought to have directed his mind to. The proportionality test 
requires the Minister to respond to the following questions. (a) Is the 
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objective of the Bill sufficiently important or legitimate? (b) Is the Bill as a 
means of attaining the policy objective stated by the Minister rationally 
connected to the said objective? In other words, is the issue of the 
shortage of lawyers likely to be addressed by what the Bill proposes? (c) 
Since the Bill obviously restricts the right to access justice and the 
principle of separation of powers can it be shown by the Minister that the 
Bill is the ‘least restrictive means’ of attaining his objective. In other 
words, is there any other more effective means of addressing the policy 
issue which impinges less on the right and principle in question? For 
example the Minister can simply appoint more lawyers. (d) Finally, the 
severity of the infringement to the right to access justice or the principle 
of separation of powers must be proportional to the objective or public 
good that the Minister wishes to attain. In other words, is the price to be 
paid through the infringement of the right or the principle too high a price 
to pay for the benefit that is expected to be realized by the proposal in the 
Bill?     
The actions of the Malawi Government in this instance suggests that 
Parliament and the Cabinet collectively chose to conveniently forget that 
the current Malawi no longer operates under parliamentary supremacy; 
we subscribe to the principle of constitutional supremacy, and therefore, 
the Constitution as the final arbiter on all matters ought to and must be 
granted the respect that it deserves.   
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